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AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 125 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 61 (December 30, 2010)1
BUSINESS LAW
Summary
An appeal from summary judgment that was granted on the theory that a Nevada LLC
whose charter is revoked loses its capacity to sue.
Disposition/Outcome
Summary judgment overturned because revocation of an LLC‟s charter does not dissolve
its capacity to sue.
Facts
AA Primo Builders, LLC (“Primo”), sued the Washingtons to recover money due for
having remodeled the Washingtons‟ patio in 2005. After two years of litigation and after Primo
failed to file required files and pay fees, the Secretary of State revoked AA Primo‟s charter to do
business as an LLC. The district court found that without a charter Primo could not maintain a
suit against the Washingtons. Primo requested time to allow them to reinstate their charter, but
the district court refused and granted the Washingtons‟ summary judgment motion.
After the district court dismissed its suit, AA Primo filed a „motion to amend order‟ that
asked to vacate the dismissal. In the motion, AA Primo included proof that its charter had been
restored and noted that NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.276(5) (2009) states that if an administrative
agency reinstates a revoked charter, the reinstatement "relates back to the date on which the
company forfeited its right to transact business . . . as if such right had at all times remained in
full force and effect." The district court denied their motion, and Primo filed a notice of appeal.
Issue 1: Whether a „motion to amend order‟ tolled the time to file a motion of appeal, thus,
granting the Nevada Supreme Court jurisdiction.
Holding: Primo‟s „motion to amend order‟ tolled the time to file their motion of appeal. "So
long as a post-judgment motion for reconsideration is [1] in writing, [2] timely filed, [3] states its
ground with particularity, and [4] 'request[s] a substantive alteration of the judgment, not merely
the correction of a clerical error, or relief of a type wholly collateral to the judgment,' . . . there is
no reason to deny it [NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(e)] status, with tolling effect under [NEV. R. APP. P.
4(a)(4)(C)]."2
Discussion
Primo claimed that its „motion to amend order‟ was a NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion that
tolled the time required to file a notice of appeal. The Washingtons argued that Primo's „motion
to amend order‟ did not toll the time to file a notice of appeal because it was really a „motion for
reconsideration,‟ and under EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b) and Nevada case law, a motion for
reconsideration does not toll the time required to file a notice of appeal.
Disposing of certain listed motions, including a NEV. R. CIV. P. 59(e) motion to alter or
amend the judgment, tolls the 30 days‟ time to file a notice of appeal.3 The Court defined a
“motion to amend the judgment” through statutes. Per Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e), a motion to amend
"[must] be filed no later than 10 days after service of written notice of entry of the judgment,"
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and per Nev. R. Civ. P. 7(b), it must be "in writing, . . . state with particularity [its] grounds [and]
set forth the relief or order sought." The Court stated that, “echo[ing]” its federal counterpart,
Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e) broadly included many types of motions, such as a motion to vacate a
judgment, motions "correct[ing] manifest errors of law or fact,' 'newly discovered or previously
unavailable evidence,' the need 'to prevent manifest injustice,' or a 'change in controlling law,‟"
and that "the only real limitation on the type of motion permitted [was] that it must request a
substantive alteration of the judgment, not merely correction of a clerical error, or relief of a type
wholly collateral to the judgment."4
The Court then found that AA Primo's „motion to amend order‟ qualified as a Nev. R.
Civ. P. 59(e) motion because it was in writing, it “invoked"5 Nev. R. Civ. P. 59, it "asked to
vacate the judgment of dismissal,"6 and it argued that the dismissal was the result of an error of
law.
Next, the Court addressed the Washingtons' argument that the "motion to amend order"
was really a motion for reconsideration.
EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b)
Under EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b), a motion for reconsideration “does not toll the 30day period for filing a notice of appeal.” However, the Court found that the first sentence of
EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b) excludes several motions, including Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e), from
EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b)‟s other provisions, and so EIGHTH DIST. CT. R. 2.24(b) does not
render a proper Nev. R. Civ. P. 59(e) motion non-tolling.7 The Court noted that the court rule
had to be read this way so as not to be inconsistent with the Nevada Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Otherwise, an inconsistency between the Nevada Rules of Appellate Procedure and
the Eighth District Court Rules would arise in violation of NEV. R. CIV. P. 83 and 91(a).8
Nevada Common Law and Motions for Reconsideration
The Court began by acknowledging that Nevada case law had distinguished motions for
reconsideration from motions to alter or amend, and that the former did not toll the time to file a
notice of appeal.9 However, the purpose of the distinction was no longer necessary in light of
NRAP 4(a)(6), and was no longer good law in light of Winston Products Co. v. DeBoer.10 The
current NRAP 4(a)(4) dissolved the need for a distinction by loosening the requirements to make
a timely appeal, and Winston stated that NRAP 4(a)(4) should not be used as a trap for unwary
draftsmen.11
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Issue 2: "Whether a Nevada limited liability company whose charter is revoked, then reinstated,
may litigate a pending suit to conclusion."12
Holding: "[Y]es, for three separate, independently sufficient reasons. First, the right to “transact
business” that is forfeited on charter revocation does not normally include an LLC‟s capacity to
sue and be sued. Second, reinstatement restores the entity‟s capacity to conduct itself as a
limited liability company retroactively to the date of revocation; this includes the right to litigate
pending cases to conclusion. Finally, dismissal should not be ordered in cases of this kind
without giving the entity a brief stay, if requested, to pursue reinstatement of its charter."13
DiscussionThe Court first noted that questions of entity capacity are reviewed de novo.
Next, the Court acknowledged that under NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.274(2), an LLC may not
transact business while its charter is revoked. However, the Court turned to a 9th Circuit case14
that interpreted "transact business" using Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary. The Nevada
Supreme Court then found that the "business" that NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.274(2) referred to was
the business the LLC was primarily engaged in. For law firms, "business" could include suing
and being sued, but business is not so for construction companies. Therefore, NEV. REV. STAT. §
86.274(2)‟s prohibition on “transact[ing] business” did not reach Primo‟s ability to sue.
Next, the Court affirmed its holding by reaching the same result through application of
NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.274, which states that an entity whose charter was revoked could follow
the same proceedings with respect to its assets as a dissolved entity. Because a dissolved entity
could sue and be sued under NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.505, an LLC with a revoked charter could
also sue and be sued.
The Washingtons argued that Primo ceased to exist when it lost its charter, and so it
could not sue or be sued. They argued that even if Primo did not cease to exist, their right to sue
or be sued died under application of NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.281(1), which (they asserted)
provides that "only 'organized and existing' companies may 'sue and be sued.'"15 Lastly, the
Washingtons argued that revoking the right to sue and be sued would deter future companies
from allowing their charters to be revoked.
To the Washingtons' first argument, the Court replied that businesses do not really cease
to exist when their charters are revoked. The Court cited several statutes and cases that allowed
dissolved or revoked entities to continue or resume activities.16
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To the Washingtons' second argument, the Court replied that the Washingtons misstated
NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.281(1) by inserting the word „only.‟ NEV. REV. STAT. § 86.281(1) is really
a list of permitted activities for Nevada LLCs.
To the Washingtons' third argument, the Court replied that refusing to allow a company
with a revoked charter to sue or be sued is too harsh a punishment for not filing required
documents or paying their fee. NEV. REV. STAT. § 86 sets forth penalties for operating with a
revoked charter, and the penalties are relatively light when compared to punishments for
companies who were never chartered.
Finally, the Court added that the district court should have allowed Primo time to
reinstate its charter because it would have avoided the unnecessary delay and expense of
dismissal, post-judgment motion practice, and appeal.

